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RECENT CASES
exemption for women from a district which has a "gross disproportion"
would be more likely to succeed than one from a "reasonably representative"
district.8 4
Whether the Taylor decision will live up to the denomination "land-
mark" is as yet an unanswered question. The Supreme Court, however, did
its best to render a decision in Taylor that would have vitality long after
the "women's exemption" is a thing of the past. Indeed, considering that
only two states still retain such an exemption, the importance of Taylor
lies in its explication of a defendant's rights under the sixth amendment.
The right to a jury venire drawn from a fair cross section of the community
necessarily requires a fair amount of community participation in the
administration of justice. The Supreme Court has indicated that both
aspects of the "fair cross section requirement" are of great importance.
Whether automatic exemptions of any class of persons, without an indi-
vidual showing of hardship or incapacity, is consistent with the protection
of the defendant's sixth amendment rights is still unanswered. Taylor v.
Louisiana helped resolve some of the difficulties inhering in the jury selec-
tion decisions and the state jury selection systems. Unresolved issues must
await further elucidation from the Supreme Court.
KATMYN MARIE KRAUSE
MUNICIPAL LAW-SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS FOR
STREET IMPROVEMENTS-TILE STANDARD)
OF REVIEW
DeFraties v. Kansas City'
Lakewood Park Cemetery Ass'n v. Metropolitan St. Louis
Sewer District2
Plaintiffs in DeFraties sought a declaratory judgment to determine
the validity of a Kansas City ordinance levying a special assessment on
their property for the cost of improvements to their abutting street. The
admitted purpose of the project was to convert plaintiffs' dead-end resi-
dential street into a trafficway3 connecting two other heavily travelled
84. If the district were "reasonably representative," the challenging defend-
ant would have no credible allegation of injury, and thus probably would lack
standing.
1. 521 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1975).
2. 580 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
3. KANSAS CITY, MIssouRI, CHARTER, art. X, § 353 (1967), defines "traffic-
ways" as being:
arteries of general traffic through the city, adapted to the safe, convenient
and facile transportation of vehicles other than those for passengers only,
in larger volume and heavier service than may be required in serving
the average traffic needs of the property abutting thereon.
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trafficways. The trial court declared the special assessment void.4 In af-
firming the judgment, the Missouri Supreme Court found that the im-
provement did not confer a special benefit, but was in fact a detriment
to plaintiffs' property. It held that making the owners pay the special as-
sessment in these circumstances amounted to a taking of their property
without due process of law.5
Special assessments are a common form of public financing for local
improvements.0 This peculiar form of taxation is levied upon property8
(usually abutting property) which is so situated in relation to the im-
provement that it derives a special benefit from it. Thus, only owners of
benefited property, as opposed to the general public, must pay for part or
i 4. 521 S.W.2d at 386. The circuit court found for the plaintiffs on the
basis that article X, section 355 of the Kansas City, Missouri charter, which denied
property owners the right of remonstrance against trafficways, was in conflict
with state statutes and a violation of due process under both the state and federal
constitutions. The supreme court did not rule on the validity of the charter pro-
vision, choosing instead to invalidate the ordinance on the grounds stated in the
text.
5. 521 S.W.2d at 388.
6. Special assessments were first authorized by the colonial New York legis-
lature in 1691. V. ROSEWATER, SPECIAL AssEssmarrrs 22-23 (1893). They became
of major importance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a de-
vice for financing the extension of services to rapidly expanding urban areas. For
example, 20 percent of Kansas City's revenues in 1913 was derived from special
assessments. Between 1913 and 1931 the amount of this type of debt increased
five-fold. The Great Dipresson, however, caused huge defaults on payments of
special assessments bonds., Since that time, they have not regained their former
relative importance in municipal financing, although the dollar amount of special
assessments has continued to &,row. TAX FOUNDATION, INC., SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS
AND SERVICE CHARGES IN MUNICIPAL FINANCE 7-10 (1970). In 1972, there were
$712,000,000 in special assessments levied; 97 percent was raised on the local level
and the remainder by state governments. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABsrAcT OF THE UNrrED STATES 1974, 248, Table No. 405.
The use of special assessments has declined substantially in cities of over
500,000 population,. New York City, for example, ceased levying them in 1962.
TAX FOUNDATION, INC., supra, at 19. However, they remain an important source
of funds for local improvements in smaller, still expanding cities (particularly
tthose under 100,000). Id. at 10. In a, representative year, 81 percent of cities
Of over 10,000. population, used special assessments to pay for street improvements.
They were also used extensively for the construction of sanitary sewers, sidewalks,
storm sewers, water lines, and, to a lesser extent, for street lighting and off-street
parking. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGER'S ASSOCIATION, MUNICIPAL FINANCE AD-
MINISTRATION 115 (6th ed. 1962).
7. Special assessments are not "taxes" within the meaning of the uniformity
requirements of the Missouri constitution. Farrar v. City of St. Louis, 80 Mo. 379
(1883); Adams v. Lindell, 5 Mo. App. 197 (1878), affd, 72 Mo. 198 (1880)(construing Mo. CONST. art. X, § 3 (1875) (now Mo. CONsT. art. X, § 3). Neverthe-
less, the levy of special assessments is attributable to the legislative exercise of the
taxing power. Haeussler Investment Co. v. Bates, 306 Mo. 392, 267 S.W. 632 (En
Banc 1924).
8. The special 'assessment creates a lien against the property itself and is not
a personal liability of-the owner. Heman Const. Co. v. Wabash R. Co., 206 Mo.
172, 179-80, 104 S.W. 67; 69 (En Banc 1907); 14 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL COR.
PORATIONS § 38.163 (3d ed. 1970 rev. vol.).
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all of the cost.9 "The justice of demanding special contributions," one au-
thor has written,
is supposed to be evident in the fact that the persons who are to
make it, while they are made to bear the cost of a public work,
are at the same time to suffer no pecuniary loss thereby; their prop-
erty being increased in value by the expenditure to an amount at
least equal to the sums they are required to pay.10
The "justice" of special assessments is not so evident to many af-
fected property owners. The justification for finding special benefits may
be very slight," the usual methods of apportionment often appear to lay-
men to be mechanical and arbitrary, 2 and the tax burden on a particular
piece of property may be very large. 13 Consequently, special assessments
are a fruitful source of litigation.
9. Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898); McCormack v. Patchin,
53 Mo. 33 (1873). Even specially benefited property may not in theory be
charged with that portion of the cost of a public improvement which is allocable
to the .general benefit of the public. Goodell v. City of Clinton, 193 N.W.2d
91 (Iowa 1971); City of St. Louis v. Pope, 844 Mo. 479, 126 S.W.2d 1201 (En
Banc 1939). Cities commonly share the cost of projects otherwise financed by
special assessments. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGER'S ASsOCIATION, supra note 6,
at 124. One method is to charge the property owners only with the cost of
widening a street to residential standards. The expense of any extra width is
borne by the general tax revenues on the theory that it is a general benefit. See, e.g.,
Goodell v. City of Clinton, supra.
10. T. COOLEY, LAw OF TAXATION 606-07 (2d ed. 1886).
11. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S.
430 (1905) (railroad right-of-way assessed for street improvement); City of Webster
Groves v. Taylor, 321 Mo. 955, 13 S.W.2d 646 (1929) (water runoff from owner's
property could not drain into storm sewer for which assessed); Powers v. City of
Grand Rapids, 98 Mich. 393, 57 N.W. 250 (1894) (riverbed assessed for street
improvement).
12. The difficulty in making an individual determination of benefits accru-
ing to each piece of property has induced most cities to apportion the total cost
of a project according to some standard rule. This practice has been condemned
by some courts, See, e.g., McNally v. Township of Teaneck, 132 N.J. Super. 442,
834 A.2d 67 (Law Div. 1975). The three most common methods of allocating
the benefits are the front-foot rule, the area rule, and the valuation rule. Under
the front-foot rule, each piece of property is assessed according to the proportion
that its frontage abutting the improvement bears to the total frontage of all
property abutting the improvement. The area and valuation rules use similar
formulas. Benefit districts may be used to assess non-abutting as well as abutting
property. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGER'S ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at 120-22.
Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898), seemed at first to cast
doubt on the validity of such arbitrary rules. However, in a series of eight cases
decided on the same day, the Supreme Court upheld the use of these rules
against constitutional attack. The leading case is French v. Barber Asphalt Pav-
ing Co., 181 U.S. 324 (1901), affg Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. French, 158 Mo.
534, 58 S.W. 934 (En Banc 1900). See also Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U.S. 389
(1901) (front-foot rule approved); Webster v. Fargo, 181 U.S. 394 (1901) (area and
valuation rules approved). Accord, Nichols v. Kansas City, 291 Mo. 690, 237 S.W.
107 (En Banc 1922) (valuation rule); Heman v. Gilliam, 171 Mo. 258, 71 S.W.
163 (1902) (front-foot rule); Johnson v. Duer, 115 Mo. 366, 21 S.W. 800 (1893)
(area rule).
13. This is particularly true where the property is a comer lot subject to mul-
tiple assessments or an irregularly shaped lot with a long frontage but little depth.
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The courts rarely grant relief to property owners faced with special
assessments because the determination of every issue connected with the
question-including the existence, amount, and allocation of special bene-
fits-is normally a legislative rather than a judicial function.14 A legisla-
tive finding of special benefits is presumptively correct,'0 and the courts
have traditionally had very little power to overturn it. There is a point,
however, beyond which the legislature may not go. 16 Missouri has followed
the general rule in defining that point-i.e., when the assessing authority's
action is manifestly arbitrary, fraudulent, unreasonable, oppressive, or
wholly unwarranted.' 7 This is, in effect, a rational basis test. In order
for a property owner to invalidate, a special assessment he must carry the
burden of proving to a reviewing court that under no reasonable theory
whatsoever can it be said that the improvement confers a special benefit
on his property.' 8 It is a difficult, but not impossible, 19 standard to meet.
DeFraties, in holding for the property owners, relied on a line of
Michigan cases which have effectively raised the standard of review for
special assessment cases. This higher standard permits the courts to decide
for themselves, as a question of fact, the existence of special benefits. In
the leading Michigan case, Fluckey v. City of Plymouth,2 0 the city attempted
to levy special assessments for "the conversion of a sleepy country road into
a 4-lane thoroughfare for heavy traffic." 2' 1 Plaintiffs' evidence established
a decline in the quality of life enjoyed by the residents abutting the
widened street because of increased safety hazards, noise, and pollution. 22
The city's case was rather weak, relying initially on the assumption that
"any road improvement automatically carries with it special benefit." 23
The court said that the city's practice of routinely equating costs with bene-
fits may not have been irrational during the early days of the automobile
age, but that it was no longer appropriate. 24 The special assessment was
In many instances special rules granting relief in these situations have been de-
vised. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGER'S ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at 122-23.
14. 70 AM. JuL- 2d, Special or Local Assessments § 158 (1973).
15. Collins v. A. Jaicks Co., 279 Mo. 404, 214 S.W. 391 (En Banc 1919); 14
E. McQuILLiN, MUNIcIPAL CoaroRAa-oNs § 38.188 (3d ed. 1970 rev. vol).
16. Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 278-79 (1898).
17. Mudd v. Wehmeyer, 323 Mo. 704, 19 S.W.2d 891 (1929); City of Webster
Groves v. Taylor, 321 Mo. 955, 13 S.W.2d 646 (1929); Heman v. Schulte, 166
Mo. 409, 66 S.W. 163 (1902).
18. Comment, Special Assessments for Road Improvement Projects in Michi-
gan-What Standard of Trial Court Review?, 20 WAYNE L. REv. 1073, 1073-79
(1974).
19. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Pope, 344 Mo. 479, 126 S.W.2d 1201 (1939);
Hesse-Rix Co. v. Krug, 319 Mo. 880, 6 S.W.2d 570 (1928).
20. 358 Mich. 447, 100 N.W.2d 486 (1960).
21. Id. at 450-51, 100 N.W.2d at 487.
22. Id. at 451-52, 100 N.W.2d at 488.
23, Id. at 452, 100 N.W.2d at 488. The city's arguments that elimination' of
dust and filling in potholes would be a benefit were dismissed as "afterthoughts."
Id. at 454, 100 N.W.2d at 489.
24. Id. at 452, 100 N.W.2d at 488. Cf. Carmichael v. Village of Beverly
Hills, 30 Mich. App. 176, 186 N.W.2d 29 (1971) (initial paving of street almost
conclusively confers special benefits).
[Vol. 41
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held void because "no reasonable person or body could conclude that...
[this improvement] would result in a net benefit to the residential prop-
erties abutting it."25
The Fluckey court did apply the traditional rational basis standard
of review. However, a flurry of subsequent Michigan cases "relied too
heavily upon Fluckey's factual situation and applied the result reached
there mechanically and without regard for the Fluckey court's statements
concerning the limitations" on judicial review of special assessments.2 6
The DeFraties court appears to have succumbed to the same temptation. It
relied primarily on the factually analogous case of Brill v. City of Grand
Rapids2 7 for the proposition that a four-lane street constructed through a
residential area completely changing the character of the neighborhood
confers no benefit on the abutting property. The court's failure to mention
the appropriate standard of review, a singular omission in Missouri special
assessment cases, indicates that it too applied the result from a factual
situation it believed to be "on all fours." Using this approach probably
achieved a correct decision in DeFraties, but it also created the possibility
that Missouri courts would confuse or ignore the proper judicial role in
reviewing special assessments, as happened in Michigan.
The supreme court was not long in providing guidance. Another spe-
cial assessments case, Lakewood Park Cemetery Ass'n v. Metropolitan St.
Louis Sewer District,2 8 was decided by division one on the same day that
the court denied the city's motion for rehearing en banc in DeFraties. In
upholding the assessment of a non-profit cemetery for the construction
of a sewer, the divisional opinion said that the determination of benefits
"was a matter of legislative discretion ... and in the absence of fraud or
unless a real and arbitrary abuse of discretion dearly appears [it] is con-
clusive on the courts."2 9
Plaintiff successfully moved for a rehearing en banc to consider the
effect of DeFraties. The full court affirmed the divisional opinion. It noted
that the assessing authority's legislative determination of public necessity
for the improvement created a presumption of special benefits to the
property. The burden of establishing the contrary rests on the property
owner, who must overcome the prima facie case "in the most satisfactory
manner."3 0 Although the court treated the case as a problem of plaintiff's
failure of proof, the dear import of its decision was that DeFraties did not
change the standard of review in Missouri and that the case will be
limited to its facts.
25. 358 Mich. at 451, 100 N.W.2d at 488.
26. Comment, Special Assessments for Road Improvement Projects in Michi-
gan-What Standard of Trial Court Review?, 20 WAYNE L. Riv. 1073, 1079
(1974).
27. 883 Mich. 216, 174 N.W.2d 832 (1970).
28. 530 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. En Banc 1975). The divisional opinion, originally
filed on April 14, 1975, was adopted by the full court without change on re-
hearing.
2. Id. at 246 (divisional opinion).
30. Id. at 248 (en banc per curam opinion).
1976]
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The theory of special assessments is deceptively simple. The real dif-
ficulties are encountered in making the factual determinations necessary to
implement the theory. This type of factual issue is not well suited to resolu-
tion by the judicial system. As Justice Holmes wrote:
There is a look of logic when it is said that special assessments are
founded on special benefits, and that a law which makes it possible
to assess beyond the amount of special benefits attempts to rise
above its source. But that mode of argument assumes an exact-
ness in the premises which does not exist .... The amount of bene-
fit which an improvement will confer on particular land-indeed,
whether it is a benefit at all, is a matter of forecast and estimate.
In its general aspects, at least, it is peculiarly a thing to be decided
by those who make the laws.3 '
Permitting the courts to determine as a question of fact the existence
of special benefits is a subtle shift away from the rational basis standard.
Nevertheless, the Michigan experience has shown that it can have an un-
settling effect on a city's ability to plan and finance local street improve-
ments.3 2 In the 16 years since Fluckey, many property owners have sought
a reviewing court's judgment as to the correctness of a city's finding of
fact that a special benefit existed. Their successes have increased signi-
ficantly over the pre-Fluckey period.33 As a result, some cities have gone to
extreme lengths to avoid having a special assessment upset.3 4
A broad interpretation of DeFraties would have allowed similar con-
sequences in Missouri. Lakewood Park forestalled that possibility by stat-
ing that Missouri will continue to follow the traditional standard of re-
view. Assuming the validity of the special assessments theory,,6 the ra-
81. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430, 433
(1905).
32. Comment, Special Assessments for Road Improvement Projects in Michi-
gan-What Standard of Trial Court Review?, 20 WAYNE L. R.v. 1073, 1091-95
(1974).
33. Id. There is a tendency for trial courts in Michigan to be especially
sympathetic to property owners. Id. at 1087-91. On the appellate level, property
owners have won the following cases based on a finding of no benefit: Bnll v.
City of Grand Rapids, 383 Mich. 216, 174 N.W.2d 832 (1970); Knott v. City of
Flint, 363 Mich. 483, 109 N.W.2d 908 (1961); Mueller v. City of Roseville, 38 Mich.
App. 170, 195 N.W.2d 882 (1972); Cusumano v. City of Detroit, 30 Mich. App.
603, 186 N.W.2d 740 (1971); Wood v. Village of Middleville, 11 Mich. App. 104,
160 N.W.2d 585 (1968). Cities have won the following cases based on a finding that
a special benefit existed: Eilender v. City of Pontiac, 371 Mich. 671, 124 N.W.2d
806 (1963); Crampton v. City of Royal Oak, 362 Mich. 503, 108 N.W.2d 16 (1961);
Johnson v. City of Inkster, 56 Mich. App. 581, 244 N.W.2d 664 (1974) (see note
34 infra); Wabeke v. City of Holland, 54 Mich. App. 215, 220 N.W.2d 756 (1974);
Axtell v. City of Portage, 82 Mich. App. 491, 189 N.W.2d 99 (1971); Soncoff v.
City of Inkster, 22 Mich. App. 358, 177 N.V.2d 243 (1970). See also Annot., 46
A.L.R.3d 127 (1972).
84. For example, in Johnson v. City of Inkster, 56 Mich. App. 581, 224 N.W.2d
664 (1974), the city drew up a benefit district for a street widening project that in-
cluded all nearby property except abutting property.
35. The theory of special assessments has been criticized as a legal fiction
with no basis in reality. C. BAsTABr, PuBLIC FNcE 166 (3d ed. 1903). Even a
Missouri court of appeals has recognized that the presumption of the existence of
[Vol. 41
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